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Abstract
In spite of very weak market conditions for almost ten years, many large firms have been
reluctant to change their wage and employment practices, at least until recently. The purpose
of this paper is to present a rational explanation of this “rigidity.” The argument is based on
workers’ learning by doing in the long-term employer-employee relationship often found in Japan.
A more motivated worker works with higher work intensity, acquires more skills, and becomes
more productive. The firm encourages workers’ learning by doing by offering long-term wage
contracts. The firm keep honoring existing long-term contracts even if economic conditions change
unexpectedly, since an adjustlnent of the wage pledged in the previous period to new conditions in
the present period is considered as a breach of the contract.
1 Introduction
One of the most distinctive characteristics of the Japanese economy in the $1990\mathrm{s}$ is apparent “rigidity”
in the labor market. After the bust of the so-called Bubble Economy at the beginning of this decade,
the Japanese economy has stagnated for almost ten years, with unprecedented weakness of consumer
and investment demand. However, in spite of this very weak market conditions, many large firms
have been reluctant to change their wage and employment $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{f}_{J}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ , at least until recently. This
lack of adjustment has been a puzzle for economists, since rational economic agents must adjust their
decision to changing economic conditions all the time.
The purpose of this paper is to present a rational $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{f}^{)}}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of this “rigidity” in the wage policy
of Japanese large {irms. The argumcnt is based on the long-term relationship between employers and
employees, which has been $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}1\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\gamma_{\lrcorner}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ as a hallmark of the labor relationship in most Japanese large
firms.
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The oft-cited merit of the long-term employer-employee relationship is that it enables workers’
learning by doing in production process1 , or equivalently, it takes advantage of the so-called experience
curve of workers. As a worker works longer with one firm, he acquires more firm-specific skills
in his workplace. These skills increase the worker’s productivity in the production process. In
addition, these skills may reduce the worker’s disutility of labor through better cooperation with his
co–workers. This advantage of long-term relationship has been argued to be large in Japan from
social and cultural reasons compared with other countries, explaining the prevalence and strength of
the Japanese long-term employer-employee relationship. There is ample evidence that such learning
by doing, or on-the-job training, is important in Japanese workplaces (see for example, Koike 1988 for
an earlier contribution and Chuma 1998 for a recent one).
In this learning-by-doing process, the degree of skill formation is dependent on worker motivation
and resulting work intensity. A more motivated worker works with higher work intensity, acquires
more skills, and becomes more productive. This dependence of learning by doing on worker motivation
and work intensity introduces an intertemporal linkage: workers’ high work intensity in the present
implies their acquisition of higher skills, which increases their productivity in the future. The firm
can motivate the worker by offering a long-term wage contract to him which pledges a higher wage in
the future, rewarding high future labor productivity acquired by intensive work done in the present.
In fact, large Japanese firms’ observed practices can be considered such long-term wage contracts in
a implicit form. The firms have a age-related $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$ profile and the shape of this wage profile is stable
over periods, so that the worker can infer its future wage from it.
We argue this intertemporal nature of learning by doing causes rigidity found in the Japanese labor
market. Because of the dependence of the present work intensity on future productivity, the firm
pledges a high wage in the future to encourage learning by doing in the present. However, once the
workers accumulate skills and become old, the firm can cut wages for the old without fearing the wage
cut’s adverse effect on skill formation of the old. Thus, the firm can increases its profit by reneging
the long-term wage contract for the old in the present and cutting their wages.
In the end, however, such an opportunistic behavior may not pay. The renege jeopardizes the
firm’s credibility and no worker of subsequent generations believes the firm’s pledge of future wages.
lIn the literature, the effect of learning by doing (that is, $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ efficiency as experince accumulates) has been
recoginized on the side of firms. It is assumed that the firm can accumulate knowlege to improve production efficiency
by learning by doing, and such knowledge spilled over to other firms (Arrow 1962). This learning by doing and its
spill-over induce endogenous $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ . Therc is a sizable literature on learning by doing and economic growth (see for an
example of recent contribution, D’Autume and Oichael 1993).
In contrast to this $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{I}^{\cdot}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$ , we are $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{I}^{\cdot}1\mathrm{l}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{d}$ with workers’ leaI ning by doing in work place in this paper. Although
there is a sizable $\mathrm{e}\iota \mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\iota \mathrm{e}$on $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{O}\backslash \vee$ such learni $\iota \mathrm{t}\mathrm{g}$ by doing and accumulation of production skills take place in
the Japanese workplacc, their $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\cdot \mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{I}11}\iota$ )[ $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ in labor warket organizations have been largely unexplored. To
our knowledge, tltis paper is tlte fitst of this kind.
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The level of workers’ learning by doing may be reduced substantially, affecting adversely the firm’s
long-run profit. If this long-run loss of the opportunistic behavior outweighs the short-run gain
outlined in the previous paragraph, the firm shuns reneging.
Suppose, then, that market conditions are changed unexpectedly. The firm, a rational economic
agent, wants to adjust its wage policy for the young and the old to changed economic conditions.
However, since the change in the old’s wage constitutes the renege of the long-term wage contract (the
wage rate pledged in the previous period), the firm is in a dilemma: to adjust the wage to trigger an
adverse reputation effect or to keep the present contract which is now inefficient. The firm rationally
chooses between the two. We argue that most Japanese firms rationally choose the latter, that is,
rigidity, since the adverse reputation effect is large in Japan.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a model of production
incorporating workers’ learning by doing. We analyze long-term wage contracts in Section 3, and
show that there is a pure seniority (age) premium in the optimal long-term contract. In Section
4, we explore the possibility of the firm’s opportunistic behavior and the credibility of the firm in
offering long-term wage contracts. In Section 5, we examine rigidity in this market when unexpected
changes occur in market conditions. We explore conditions for the firm not to adjust the wage to
these unexpected changes.
2 A Model of Work Intensity and Workers’ Learning by Doing
2.1 Work Intensity, Learning by Doing and Labor Productivity
To capture characteristics of the labor market of Japanese large firms as simple as possible, we consider
a segmented labor market consisting of one firm and a set of workers attached to the firm. The firm
is a going $\mathrm{c}o.\mathrm{n}$cern with infinite horizon, while workers live in two periods. Generation-t workers are
born in period $t$ , work for the firm in period $t$ as young workers and in period $t+1$ as old workers, and
die at the end of period $t+1$ . Workcr generations overlap one another: generation-t young workers
work with generation $t-1$ old workers. Workers are homogeneous within one generation, so that we
consider the representative worker in each generation in the $\mathrm{f}.0$.llowing analysis. The firm determines
the wages for the young and for the old, while the worker determines his work intensity. To simplify
analysis further, we assume that (a) the price of the firm’s product is given to the firm, (b) the firm’s
technology exhibits constant returns to scale, and (c) work hours are fixed and normalized to be unity.
The worker’s productivity depends OI1 his work intensity denoted by $X$ . In particular, we assume a
linear relationship bctween $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$ in the form of the following $:$) $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ function of the young worker,
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$F_{Y\sigma ung}(X_{Young})$ :
$F_{Young}(X_{Young})=X_{Y\sigma ung}$ ; $X_{Young}$ : Young’s work intensity.
Thus, the firm can perfectly infer the level of work intensity from the level of production.
Let us now characterize the effect of learning by doing. The worker acquires skills when young and
increases his productivity when old. The level of acquired skills is dependent on the work intensity.
To incorporate this learning by doing, we assume the following production function of the old worker
$F_{Old} \frac{X_{Young}}{},X_{Old})--(1+\delta\overline{X_{Young}})X_{Old;}$ $X_{Old}$ : Old’s work intensity,
where $\delta>0$ and the upper bar over $X_{Young}$ indicates that the variable is determined in the previous
period and fixed in this period.
Let $P$ be the price of the firm’s product. Under the assumption of.price-taking behavior, the total
revenue of the firm is
Revenue $=$ $P \{F_{Young}(X_{Young})+F_{Old}\frac{X_{Young}}{},X_{Old})\}$
$=$ $P(X_{Young}+X_{Old})+P(\delta\overline{X_{Youn_{\mathit{9}}}})X_{Old}$,
where the last term represents the proceeds from learning by doing.
We assume that (a) the firm offers different base (piece) wage rate for the young and the old
($W_{Young}$ and $W_{Old}$ ) and that (b) the proceeds from learning by doing are shared between the firm and
the worker by the ratio of $1-\theta$ and $\theta$ . We further assume the sharing ratio $\theta$ is exogenously $0_{1}\sigma \mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$.
Under the above sharing scheme, the wage payments and the profit are, respectively,
Wage payments for the young $=$ $W_{Young}X_{Young}$ (1)
Wage payments for the old $=$ $W_{old}X_{Old}+\theta P(\delta\overline{X_{Young}})X_{Old}$ (2)
and
Profit $=$ $(P-\nu V_{Younq}.)X_{Young}$
$+(l^{\supset}‘-\nu V_{Old})X_{Old}+(1-\theta)P\delta\overline{X_{Young}}X_{Old}$ (3)
2.2 Worker’s Life-Time Utility and Work-Intensity Determination
The representative worker of generation $t$ enters the labor market in period $t$ , works for two periods
( $t$ and $t+1$ ) and exits afterwards. The worker’s utility depends on the level of consumption, work
hours, and work intcnsity. $l\prime \mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}$ have assumed that labor hours are constant and normalized to be
unity. Taking this in mind we aesume that the generation-t, worker’s life-time utility is
$u_{t}$ $=$ $Z_{\ell 0}-f_{1}X_{t0}- \frac{f_{2}}{2}(X_{t0})^{2}$
$+ \beta(Z_{t1}-f_{1}X_{t1}-\frac{f\underline{)}}{2}‘(X_{t1})^{2})-f_{3}X_{t0},X_{t1}$
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where $f_{1}>0$ and $f_{2}>0$ . $Z$ denotes the consumption of goods, whose price is assumed to be unity.
Here subscript $t$ denotes the generation, subscript $0$ indicates the value when he is young, 1 indicatae
the value when he is old. In particular, $X_{t0}$ and $X_{t1}$ are
$X_{t0}$ : generation-t worker’s work intensity when young at period $t$
$X_{t1}$ : generation-t worker’s work intensity when old at period $t+1$ .




the latter of which guarantees the concavity of the firm’s generational profit function (see Appendix).
The former is necessary for production to be economically profitable.
There are several distinctive features in this formulation. First, work intensity has a negative
effect on utility and the marginal disutility of work intensity is increasing. Second, there might be
a learning-by-doing effect represented by the last term $-f_{3}X_{t0}X_{t1}$ . The worker may acquire skills
to get along with his coworkers, which may decrease disutility of work. This case is represented
by the negative $f_{3}$ caee in the above formulation. The formulation also includes the case of the
burned-out effect, in which high work intensity when young increases disutility of work when old (a
positive $f_{3}$ ). Third, the life-time utility function is quasi-linear, so that there is no income effect on
the determination of work intensity, which reduces complexity of the model greatly.
The budget constraint of the representative generation-t worker is, from (1) and (2)
$Z_{t0}+\beta Z\iota\iota=W_{t0}X_{t0}+\beta(W_{t\iota}+\theta\delta P\overline{X_{t0}})X_{t1}$.
The worker maximizes his life-long utility under the constraint of the life-long budget, with respect
to the consumption $Z_{t0}$ and $Z_{t1}$ and the work intensity $X_{t0}$ and $X_{t1}$ . Since the model is dynamic, we
analyze the worker’s work-interlsity determination backward to first examine the old worker’s problem.
Work Intensity of the Generation-t Old Since the utility function is quasi-linear, the generation-
$t$ old worker’s budget-constrained utility maximization is $\iota\cdot \mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ to the following unconstrained max-
imization:
$\max_{\wedge}X_{t1}[\beta(lV_{t1}X_{\ell 1}+\theta\delta P\overline{X_{\ell 0}}X_{t1}-f_{1}X_{\ell 1}-\frac{f_{9}\sim}{2}(X_{t1})^{2})-f_{3}\overline{X_{t0}}X_{t1}]$
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for given $\overline{X_{t0}}$ . The first order condition of this problem is
$W_{t1}+\theta\delta P\overline{X_{t0}}-f_{1}-f_{2}X_{t1}-\beta^{-1}f_{3}\overline{X_{t0}}=0$. (5)
Solving this first order condition, we obtain the old’s work intensity such that
$X_{t1}=X^{1}X_{t0}\ulcorner,$$W_{t1}]- \equiv\frac{-f_{1}+\xi\overline{X_{t0}}+W_{t1}}{f_{2}}$ , (6)
where
$\xi\equiv\theta\delta P-\beta^{-1}f_{3}$ . (7)
The work-intensity function (6) shows that a higher wage induces a higher work intensity. More-
over, if there is a positive effect of learning by doing $(\delta>0\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}f_{3}<0)$ , then $\xi$ is positive. Thus,
a higher work intensity in the previous period induces a higher work intensity in the present period.
Work Intensity of the Generation-t Young By the same argument as in the previous sub-
section, the generation-t young’s life-time utility maximization is reduced to
$\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}X_{t0}(W_{t0}X_{t0}-f_{1}X_{t0}-\frac{f_{2}}{2}(X_{t0})^{2})$
$+ \beta\{(W_{t1}^{e}+\theta\delta PX_{t0})\overline{X^{1}}-f_{1}\overline{X^{1}}-\frac{f_{2}}{2}(\overline{X^{1}})^{2}\}-f_{3}X_{t0}\overline{X^{1}}$,
where $\overline{X^{1}}=\overline{X^{1}}[X_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}]$ defined in (6). Note that $l/V_{t1}^{e}$ is the e.x$\mathrm{p}.\mathrm{e}$.ctations formed in this period
about the next-period’s wage rate for the old, $W_{t1}$ . Taking account of the envelope relation (5), we
have the first order condition such that
$W_{t0}-f1-f_{2}X_{t0}+\beta(\theta\delta P-\beta^{-1}f_{3})X^{1}-[X_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}]=0$ .
Consequently, the work intensity of the young, $X_{t0}$ , is
$X_{t0}=X^{0}[W_{\ell 0}, W_{t1}^{e}] \equiv\frac{-f_{1}f_{2}-\beta f_{1}\xi+f_{2}W_{t0}+\beta\xi W_{t1}^{e}}{(f_{2})^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}}$ (8)
Since (4) implies
$(f_{2})^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}>0$ , (9)
we know that a higher current wage induces a higher current work intensity. Moreover, if there is
a positive effect of learning by doing ( $\delta>0$ and $f_{3}<0$ ), a higher expected wage in the next period
induces a higher work intensity in $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ present period. A higher wage in the next period implies a
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higher utility return from learning by doing, and thus the worker increases its work intensity in the
praeent.2
Substituting (8) into (6) and substituting $W_{t1}$ with $\nu V_{t1}^{e}$ , we obtain the planned work intensity as
a function of $(W_{t0},W_{t1}^{e})$ :
$X_{t1}^{P\mathrm{t}anned}=X^{1}[W_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}] \equiv\frac{-f_{1}(f_{2}+\xi)+\xi W_{t0}+f_{2}W_{t1}^{e}}{(f_{2})^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}}$ (10)
2.3 The Current Profit and the Value of the Firm
Substituting the results obtained in the previous sub-section into (3), the current profit for the firm
in the period $t$ is
$\overline{\pi(t})\frac{X_{t-1,0}}{},$ $\nu V_{t-1,1},$ $W_{\ell 0},$ $W_{t1}^{e})$ (11)
$=$ $(P-W_{t0})X^{0}[W_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}]$
$+[P\{1+(1-\theta)\delta\overline{X_{t-1,0}}\}-W_{t-1,1}]X^{1}-\mapsto X_{t-1,0},$ $W_{t-1,1}]$ .
Similarly, the current profit at in the period $t+1$ is
$\pi(\overline{t+}1)(X^{0}[W_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}], W_{t1}, W_{t+1,0}, W_{t+1,1}^{e})$ (12)
$=$ $(P-W_{t+1,0})X^{0}[W_{\ell+1,0}, W_{t+1,1}^{e}]$
$+[P\{1+(1-\theta)\delta X^{0}[W_{t0}, W_{t1}^{e}]\}-\nu V_{\ell 1}]\overline{X^{1}}[X^{0}[W_{\ell 0}, W_{t1}^{e}],$ $W_{t1}]$ .
Consequently, the value of the firm is thus determined as
$V$ $=$ $\overline{\pi(t})(\overline{X_{t-1,0}}, W_{\ell-1,1}, W_{t0}, \dagger^{\mathit{1}}V_{t1}^{e})$
$+\beta\pi(\overline{t+}1)(X^{0}[W_{t0}, W_{\ell 1}^{e}])1/V_{t1},$ $W_{t+1,0},$ $W_{t+1,1}^{e})$
$+\cdots$ (13)
3 Overlapping Long-Term Wage Contracts and Incentive to Renege
It is often observed that large Japanese firms have an $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}arrow \mathrm{b}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ wage profile, in which old workers
receive higher wages than young workers, and that the shape of this age-related wage profile is stable
over periods. Thus, young workers can infer their wages when they become old from this age-based
wage profile. The age-based wage profile and its long-run stability can be interpreted as the firm’s
2Marginal utility of the worker from learning by doing is $\beta\theta\delta PX_{\mathrm{t}1}$ . An increase in the future wage $W_{t1}$ increases $X_{t1}$
and thus increases the rnarginal utility of lcarning by doing.
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offering long-term wage contracts to young workers specifying the wage when they are young and when
they are old, and honoring past long-term wage contracts for old workers. However, these long-term
wage contracts are implicit, since future wages of th.e young when they become old are not specified
in actual $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$ contracts.
In Section 3.1, we examine wage and work-intensity determination in our model of learning by doing
under the regime of long-term wage contracts and show that the wage profile is in fact age-based with
pure seniority (age) premium. The long-term wage contract for generation-t workers is here defined as
a pair of the wage rates when young and when old for each generation, { $(W_{t0},$ $W_{t1})$ for generation $t$}.
Since there are generation-t young workers and generation-t-l old ones in period $t$ , these generational
wage contracts overlaps one another.
The implicit long-term $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$ contract, however, has an inherent $\mathrm{p}.\mathrm{r}$oblem of a renege incentive. We
show in Section 3.2 that the firm has a strong incentive to renege the long-term wage contract when
workers are old, if young $.\mathrm{w}$orkers st.ill believe the firm’s pledge to honor the long-term wage contract
for them in the future. Such a temptation to renege is overcome only when the renege of the wage
contract for one generation triggers mistrust of the firm’s pledge. in subsequent gene..rations, which in
turn reduces the firm’s profits in the future substantially. In Section 3.3, we examine conditions under
$\grave{\mathrm{w}}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ this $\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{s}}$ the case, so that implicit long-term wage contracts $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by $\mathrm{t}$he- firm is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{b}}$le.
3.1 Wages and Work Intensity under the Long-Term-Contract Regime
Suppose that the implicit $1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$-term wage contract is credible, so that the workers trust the firm’s
pledge and that the firm honors its pledge. In this case, we have $W_{t1}^{e}=W_{t1}$ for all $t$ . In addition,
since the firm honors its paet pledge, $\overline{\nu V_{t-1,1}}$ (wage for the period-t old pledged in the previous period)
is given. Then, for given $\overline{X_{t-1,0}}$ (work intensity of the previous period), the firm’s value is
$V$ $=$ $\overline{\pi(t})(\overline{X_{t-1,0}},\overline{W_{t-1,1}}, W_{t0}, \mathrm{T}/V_{\ell 1})$
$+\beta\pi(\overline{t+}1)(X^{0}[W_{t0}, \nu V_{t1}], \nu V_{t1}, W_{t+1,0}, W_{t+1,1})$
$+\ldots$
The firm maximizes its value with respect to the $1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}- \mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}111\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$contracts { $(W_{t0},$ $W_{t1})$ for generation $t$ }.
Thus, the first order condition is for $t.\geq 0$
$[\overline{\pi(t})]_{3}+\beta[\pi(\overline{t+}1)]_{1}[X^{0}]_{1}$ $=$ $0$ ;
$[\overline{\pi(t})]_{4}+\beta([\pi(\overline{t+}1)]_{1}[X^{0}]_{2}+[\pi(\overline{t+}1)]_{2})$ $=$ $0$
Here $F_{i}$ denotes the derivative of the function $F$ with respect to the i-th argument. By solving these
equations, the long-tern] wage contract $(W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O})$ is
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$W_{0}^{O}= \frac{P+f_{1}}{2}+\frac{1}{2}\beta P\delta(1-\theta)(P-f_{1})\frac{P\delta(1-\theta)+\underline{9}(f_{2}+\xi)}{4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(2\xi+(1-\theta)P\delta)^{2}}$ (wage for the young) (14)
$W_{1}^{O}=W_{0}^{O}+ \delta(P-f_{1})\frac{f_{2}P(1-\theta)(1-\beta)}{4(f_{2})^{2}-\beta(2\xi+(1-\theta)P\delta)^{2}}$ (wage for the old) (15)
Here superscript $O$ indicates that optimal wages under the long-term-contract regime are the optimal
Open-Loop policy in the terminology of control theory.
We have assumed that $P>f_{1}$ and 4$f_{2}^{2}-\beta(2\xi+P\delta(1-\theta))^{2}>0$ . Under these conditions, (14)
and (15) show that $\partial W_{0}^{O}/\partial\delta>0$ , and $\partial W_{1}^{O}/\partial\delta>0$ so long as $\delta>0$ and $\theta>0$ . Thus, if there is
a positive learning by doing effect on productivity in the future $(\delta>0)$ and that the worker has a
positive share of it $(\theta>0)$ , the firm increases wages to motivate the worker to learn more by doing in
the present with higher work intensity.
Moreover, we have $W_{1}^{O}>W_{0}^{O}$ when $\delta>0$ and $\theta>0$ , since $1>\beta$ : The firm offers a higher base
wage for the old. It should be noted that the old worker gets its share of the proceeds ffom learning
by doing, in addition to this higher base wage. Thus we have a pure seniority premium (higher wage
rate for the old than for the young).
The reason of this seniority effect is intuitive. Both a higher wage for the young $W_{\ell 0}$ and that for
the old $W_{t1}$ can induce higher work intensity in the present in a similar way, when both direct and
indirect effects are properly accounted for. However, the wage for the old $W_{t1}$ is paid in the future
and is discounted in the consumer’s utility calculation, while the wage for the young is not. In order
to offset this effect, the firm has to pay a higher wage for the old than that for the young.
Substituting (14) and (15) into (8) and (10), we have the work intensity of the young and the old
under the implicit long-term $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$ contract $[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]$ :
$X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]=(P-f_{1}) \frac{\beta P\delta(1-\theta)+2(f_{2}+\beta\xi)}{4f_{2}^{2}-,\mathit{6}(P\delta(1-\theta)+2\xi)^{2}}$ (16)
$X^{1}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]=(P-f_{1}) \frac{P\delta(1-\theta)+2(f_{2}+\xi)}{4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(P\delta(1-\theta)+2\xi)^{2}}$ (17)
3.2 Firm’s Incentive to Renege
Suppose, as a thought expe$7\dot{\tau}ment$ , that the firm in $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\iota\cdot \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}t$ can renege its implicit long-term wage
contract $W_{\ell-1,1}=\nu V_{1}^{O}$ for the generation-t–l old $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{o}\iota\cdot 1\backslash \mathrm{c}\prime \mathrm{r}$ and offer a new wage $W_{t-1,1}$ but that the
young worker of the generation-t and subsequent $gene?(’$ tions still believes the firm’s pledge to honor
long-term wage contract $(\nu V_{t0}, \mathrm{t}V_{t1})=(\nu V_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O})$ for $t/|C7t$ . In this sub-section, we show that the
firm always has an incentive to renege the long-terIn $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}111_{}\mathrm{I}^{\cdot}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ in this case.
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If the young worker still believe $(\nu V_{t0}, W_{t1})=(W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O})$ , the only difference in profits between
the renege case and the non-renege case is the profit from the generation-t–l old’s work, which is
from (3) and (6)
$\overline{\pi}_{t}^{Old}=(P-W_{t-1,1})\overline{X^{1}}[X_{Young}^{O}, W_{t-1,1}]+(1-\theta)P\delta X_{Young}^{O}\overline{X^{1}}[X_{Young}^{O}, W_{t-1,1}]$ .
where $X_{Y\sigma ung}^{O}=X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]$ is predetermined and fixed in this period. The maximization of this
renege profit determines the optimal renege wage for the old, which is
$W_{t-1,1}^{R}[X_{Young}^{O}]= \nu V_{1}^{O}-\frac{1}{2}\xi(P-f_{1})\frac{2(f_{2}+\beta\xi)+\beta P\delta(1-\theta)}{4f_{\tilde{2}}^{9}-\beta(P\delta(1-\theta)+2\xi)^{2}}$ . (18)
Thus, the optimal renege wage $W_{t-1,1}^{R}$ is always lower than the optimal wage pledge $W_{1}^{O}$ . The firm
always has an incentive to cut the old’s wage if such wage cut has no adverse effect on young workers.
This is because the firm does not have to take an adverse effect of such a wage cut on the generation-
$t-1$ old’s learning by $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{t}\supset}\sigma$ , since that learning took place in the previous period. Because the
wage is lower, the work intensity in the renege case, $X_{O’ d}^{R}$ , is also lower than the work intensity of the
no-renege case, $X_{Old}^{O}=X^{1}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]$ .
$X_{Old}^{R}$ $=$ $\overline{X^{1}}[X_{Young}^{O}, W_{t-1,1}^{R}[X_{Young}^{O}]]$
$=$
$X_{Old}^{O}- \frac{1}{2}\xi\frac{(P-f_{1})[2(f_{2}+\beta\xi)+\beta P\delta(1-\theta)]}{f_{2}(4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(2\xi+P\delta(1-\theta))^{2})}$
Let us now measure the gain from this renege. Let $\overline{\pi(t})_{old}^{O}$ and $\overline{\pi(t})_{old}^{R}$ denote the period-t profit
from the generation-t–l old’s work in the no-renege case and in the renege case, respectively, such
that
$-\mathit{0}$
$\pi(t)_{old}$ $\equiv$ $[P-W_{1}^{O}]X_{Old}^{O}+(1-\theta)(P\delta X_{Young}^{O})X_{Old}^{O}$
$\overline{\pi(t})_{old}^{R}$
$=$ $[P-W_{t-1,1}^{R}(X_{Young}^{O})]X_{O\prime\prime_{C}}^{R}+(1-\theta)(P\delta X_{Y\sigma ung}^{O})X_{Old}^{R}$
Substituting the results of (??) and (18), we obtain the gain from the renege
$\overline{\pi(t})_{old}^{R}-\overline{\pi(t})_{old}^{O}=\frac{1}{4}(P-f_{1})^{2}\frac{\xi^{2}}{f_{2}}\frac{(^{\underline{9}}(f_{2}+\beta\xi)+\beta P\delta(1-\theta))^{2}}{(4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(P\delta(1-\theta)+2\xi)^{2})^{2}}$
If there is a positive effect of learning by doing $(\delta>0\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}f_{3}<0)$ and that the worker has a
positive share of the proceeds from $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\iota\cdot \mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ by $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{e}\supset}\sigma$ , thc tcrm $\xi=\theta\delta P-\beta^{-1}f_{3}$ is positive. Then, it
is evident that the gain from the rencge is positive, so $\mathrm{t}1\mathrm{l}_{\mathrm{C}}’\iota \mathrm{t}$ the firm has a strong incentive to renege
in this case.
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3.3 Worker Reaction to the Renege and Conditions for Credible Long-TermWage
Contracts
In the previous section, we have assumed as a thought experiment that the young worker of the
generation-t and subsequent generations still believe the firm’s pledge to honor long-term wage contract
for them in the future even if the firm reneges the contract for the old in the present, and have shown
that the firm has a strong incentive to renege the long-term wage contract. However, once the firm
reneges the long-term wage contract for generation-t–l old workers, it is very likely that young
workers of generation-t and subsequent generations do not trust the firm’s pledge of honoring the
long-term wage contract for them in the future. If this is the case, the firm can only offer spot wage
contracts, specifiing only the current wages for the young and the old.
In Section 3.3.1, we first derive the firm value under the regime of spot wage contracts. By using
this result, the firm valu..e is compared between the renege case and the no-renege case in Section 3.3.2,
and derive the net gain of $\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ the long-term wage contract.
Under rational expectations hypothesis, long-term contract offers are credible only if the net gain of
keeping the long-term wage contract is positive. In Section 3.3.3, we derive the conditions under which
the firm chooses not to renege and keeps to honor the long-term wage contract, that is, conditions for
credible long-term wage contracts.
3.3.1 Firm Value under the Spot-Contract Regime
Suppose that the firm can only offer spot wage contracts, specifying the current wage for the young
and the old. The spot wage contract in period $t$ is a pair of the wage for the old and that for the
young, $(W_{t-1,1}, W_{\ell 0})$ .
The firm’s problem is now to maxilnize its value (13). which is rewritten here for convenience,
$V$ $=$ $\overline{\pi(t})\frac{X_{t-10}}{},$ $W_{t-1,1},$ $W_{t0},$ $\nu V_{t1}^{e})$
$+\beta\pi(\overline{t+}1)(X^{0}[W_{\ell 0}, W_{\ell 1}^{e}], \mathrm{I}/V_{t1}, W_{t+1,0}, W_{t+1,1}^{e})$
$+\ldots$
with respect to the spot wage contract $(\nu V_{\ell-1,1}, W_{t0})$ for a given level $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\overline{X_{t-1,0}}$ (the present-period old
worker’s work intensity when he $\backslash \backslash ’ \mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}$ young in the previous period), taking account of the expectation
formation of the workers. Here $\tau\downarrow(t)$ and $\pi(t+1)$ are clefined in (11) and (12). As for expectation
formation of the workers, $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ assume $\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{c}}\backslash \mathrm{t}$ ional expectations.
The firm value in this case can be derived by the $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}1_{1\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{d}$ of dynamic programming. Assume, as
an educated guess, that the representative worker’s $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{x}$ ]) $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}(i\iota \mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ formation is characterized by
$\nu \mathfrak{s}/’\ell^{e_{1}}=h(W_{t0})\equiv l\iota_{0}+/_{1,1}\mathrm{T}\prime V_{\ell 0}$ , (19)
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where $h_{0}$ and $h_{1}$ are undetermined coefficients. Then, the necessary condition for the optimum is the
following Bellman equation:
$V^{C}(X_{t-1,0})=\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{x}W_{t-1,1}^{\cdot},\mathrm{t}V_{t0}$ , (20)
where $V^{C}(X_{t-1,0})$ is the firm’s value under spot-contract regime.
Assume again as an educated guess that
$V^{C}(x)=\eta_{0}+\eta_{1}x+\eta_{2}x^{2}$ (21)
where $\eta_{0},$ $\eta_{1}$ and $\eta_{2}$ are undetermined coefficients. Then. by using the undermined coefficient method,
we obtain the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w},.\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ solution of the Bellman equation and the expectation function (see Appendix).
The parameters in the expectation function $h$ are
$h_{0}$ $=$ $\frac{P(f_{2}^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}-\delta f_{1}(1-\theta)(f_{2}+\beta\xi))+f_{2}f_{1}(f_{2}+\xi)}{\underline{9}(f_{2})^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}-(1-\theta)\delta P\beta\xi}$ ; (22)
$h_{1}$ $–$ $\frac{f_{2}((1-\theta)\delta P-\xi)}{2(f_{2})^{2}-\beta\xi^{2}-(1-\theta)\delta P\beta\xi}$ . (23)
while the parameters in the value function $V^{C}$ are
$\eta_{0}$ $=$
$\frac{1}{1-\beta}\frac{(P-f_{1})^{2}}{4f_{2}}(1+\frac{(2f_{2}+^{\underline{\mathrm{Q}}}\beta\xi+\beta P\delta(1-\theta))^{2}}{4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(3\xi+P\delta(1-\theta))(\xi+P\delta(1-\theta))})$ ; (24)
$\eta_{1}$ $=$ $(P-f_{1}) \frac{(P(1-\theta)\delta+\xi)}{\underline{9}f\underline{)}}$ ; (25)
$\eta_{2}$ $=$
$\frac{((1-\theta)\delta P+\xi)^{\mathcal{D}}\sim}{4f_{2}}$ (26)
3.3.2 Net Gains from Honoring the Long-Term Wage Contract
Let us now derive the firm value when the firm renegcs the long-run wage contract for the old in
one generation, under the assumption $t,f’,at$ such a renege jeopardizes the confidence of the subsequent
worker generations in the firm’s pledge. We compare $\mathrm{t}_{}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ the firm value when the firm keeps to
honor the long-term $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma \mathrm{e}$ contract.
Suppose ae i..n the previous section that the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\tau 1$ ) $\mathrm{a}.\mathrm{s}$ kept to honor the long-term wage contract
up until period $t-1$ , but that $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\iota\cdot \mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}$ decides to rencgo the long-term wage contract in period $t$ .
Then, the old worker’s work intensity in the previous [$)(^{)}\iota\cdot \mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}1$ is $X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, \nu V_{1}^{O}]$ , so that the result in
the previous period $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ that the $\mathrm{v}_{\dot{\mathfrak{c}}}\iota 1$ne of the $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{I}1_{\neg}^{()}}‘ \mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\backslash$ is $V^{C}(X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}])$ .
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Next consider the value of the firm honoring its long-term wage contract all the time, which is





By using the above results, the net gain of honoring the long-term contract can be derived, with
tedious calculation, which is
$V^{O}-V^{C}(X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}])$
$=$ $\frac{1}{4f_{2}}\frac{1}{(1-\beta)}[\frac{(P-f_{1})^{2}\xi^{\underline{9}}\{2(f_{2}+\beta\xi)+\beta P\delta(1-\theta)\}^{2}}{[4f_{\tilde{2}}^{9}-\beta\{2\xi+P\delta(1-\theta)\}^{2}]^{2}}][\frac{(2\beta-1)\Psi-\beta^{2}\xi^{2}}{\Psi}]$ (27)
where
$\Psi$ $=$ 4$f_{2}^{2}-3\mathcal{B}\xi^{2}-4\xi\beta P\delta(1-\theta)-\beta\{P\delta(1-\theta)\}^{2}$
$>$ 4$f_{2}^{2}-\beta\{^{\underline{9}}\xi+P\delta(1-\theta)\}^{2}>0$ ,
since we have assumed the latter inequality in (4) with $\xi\equiv\theta\delta P-\beta^{-1}f_{3}$ . Thus
$sgn[V^{O}-V^{C}(X^{0}[\nu V_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}])]=sgn[(2\beta-1)\Psi-\beta^{2}\xi^{2}]$ (28)
If the net gain is $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\dot{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ , then the firm shuns reneging. Under our rational expectations as-
sumption, workers know this fact and consider credible thc firm’s pledge to honor the long-term wage
contract in the future. Then, the long-t $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}$ wage $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}_{1}\cdot \mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ becomes self-enforcing. However, if the net
gain is negative, then the firm reneges the contract in the present and in the future. Rational workers
correctly anticipate this behavior and do not trust the plcdge of the firm to honor the long-term wage
contract. Since no $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ believes $\mathrm{t}1_{1\mathrm{e}])}1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$ , only spot $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$ contracts are possible.
3.3.3 Conditions for Credible Long-Term Wage Contracts
The relation (28) detcrmines the conditions under which thc long term wage contract is credible.
First, if $\beta<1/2$ , then the net gain is $11\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$. Thi.s $\iota\iota\iota(_{J}^{\backslash _{\dot{\zeta}}}\iota \mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{S}$ that if the discount rate is high, then
long term wage contract is not crediblr. This result $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}|$ )[ $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{s}$ that the long-term wage contract is not
ubiquitous even though there is a $\mathrm{s}n1$) $.\backslash \mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}11_{\circ}^{()}- \mathrm{t}_{)}\mathrm{y}$-doing opportunity. The long-term wage
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contract, and thus a high level of learning by doing, is not likely to be observed in a high-discount-rate
economy.
If $\delta>0$ and $f_{3}=0$ , that is, $1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ by doing matters only in production process, the condition
for credible long-term wage contract is substantially simplified. In this case, we have




Consequently, we have by arranging terms
$sgn[V^{O}-V^{C}(X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}])]$ $=$ $sgn[4(2\beta-1)f_{2}^{2}-\beta P^{2}\delta^{2}[(2\beta-1)(2\theta+1)-\beta\theta^{2}]]$
$=$ $sgn[ \frac{2f_{2}}{P\sqrt{\beta(2\theta+1)+\frac{\beta^{2}\theta^{2}}{2\beta-1}}}-\delta]$
Thus, so long as the $1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}- \mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}- \mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}\sigma$ effect $\delta$ is not large, the long-term wage contract is credible.
In contrast, if the learning by doing effect is large, then the firm’s gain ffom renege is large, which
makes the long-term wage contract unsustainable.
Numerical Examples Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the range of the parameters making the long-term
wage contract credible. In these figures, we set $f_{2}=P=1$ . The area below the thin curve in figure 1
is the domain of $(\theta, \delta)$ that supports credible long-term wage contracts for fixed $\beta(=0.6)$ . This figure
shows that if the worker’s share of the proceeds from learning by doing, the range $0\dot{\mathrm{f}}$ the credible
long-term wage contract shrinks. However, even if the worker takes all of the proceeds, the firm still
has an incentive to honor the long-term contract if $\delta$ is not so large, for example, if $\delta=0.5>0$ . (The
marginal productivity of the old is $(1+\delta)$ while that of the young is 1. Therefore, $\delta=0.5$ means the
old’s marginal productivity is 1.5 times as much as the young’s.)
Figure 2 shows the domain of $(\beta, \delta)$ that supports credible long-term wage contracts for $\theta=$
$0.1$ (gray line), 0.5 (black thin line) and 1 (black bold line). The area below each line represents
$(\beta, \delta)$ supporting credible long-ternu contract. As $\beta \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\iota\cdot \mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{s}$ , the domain of $\delta$ that supports credible
contracts is eventually narrowed.
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Figure 1: $(\theta, \delta)$ supporting long-term contracts
Figure 2: $(\delta,\beta)$ supporting credible long-term $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}$ contracts for $\theta=0.1$ (Gray), 0.5 (Black, Thin), 1
(Black, Bold)
4 Unanticipated Change of $P$ and Wage Rigidity
Let us now take up the issue of $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{o}}\circ$ idity. In this section, we consider the case that there is an
unexpected change in market conditions. and examine whether the firm adjusts the long-term contract
to a new condition or the firln chooses not to adjust it and keeps the long-term contract pledged in
the past.
Suppose that the market has been in a stable condition for a long time, and the firm’s long-term
contracts have been the optimal one for that condition. Suppose then that the market condition has
changed unexpectedly. In particular, we assume that the firm’s product price hae changed from $P$ to
$P-100*\triangle_{P}$ permanently. That is. the $1$) $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ price hrs dropped by $\Delta_{P}\%$ .
As in the previous section, we assuIltc that the firm’s rencge of the long-term contract for the old
worker damages thc confidence of thc $.\backslash .\cdot o$ung worker on $\mathrm{t}_{}11\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\iota \mathrm{n}’ \mathrm{s}$ long-term wage contract, so that
once the firm reneges, the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\iota \mathrm{n}$ is no longcr able to use $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}- \mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\iota\cdot \mathrm{m}$ contracts.
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Direct Effect of Price Change on Work Intensity. In our model, the change in the maxket
price directly affects the proceeds of the learning by doing. Since the worker shares a part of these
proceeds (see (2)) $)$ the price change directly influences the worker’s work-intensity decision. From
(6), (8) and (10), new work-intensity function is, for the old,
$\overline{X^{1}}\ulcorner X_{t0},$ $W_{t1;}P(1- \triangle_{P})]\equiv\frac{-f_{1}+(\theta\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})-\beta^{-1}f_{3})\overline{X_{\ell 0}}+W_{t1}}{f_{2}}$ .
Similarly, the young’s work-intensity is
$X^{0}[W_{\ell 0}, \nu V_{t1}^{e} ; P(1-\Delta_{P})]$
$\equiv$ $\frac{-f_{1}f_{2}-\beta(\xi-\theta P\delta\Delta_{P})+f_{2}W_{t0}+\beta(\xi-\theta}{(f_{2})^{2}-\beta(\xi-\theta P\delta\triangle_{P})^{2}},P\underline{\delta\Delta_{P})W_{\ell 1}^{e}}$
and the young’s planned work-intensity in the next period is
$X^{1}[W_{t0}, \dagger’\iota/_{t1} ; P\prime e(1-\triangle_{P})]$
$\equiv$ $\frac{-f_{1}f_{2}-f_{1}(\xi-\theta P\delta\triangle_{P})+(\xi-\theta P\delta\triangle_{P})\mathrm{V}\mathrm{t}_{t0}^{\gamma}.+f_{2}W_{\ell 1}^{e}}{f_{2}^{2}-\beta(\xi-\theta P\delta\triangle_{P})^{2}}..\cdot$
.
The Value of Firm Honoring the Long-Term
$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}’ \mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ ($\grave{\mathrm{W}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$ Rigidity). Suppose that the
firm honors the long-term contract $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}^{\cdot}$ the old (the case of rigid wages). Thus, the generation-t–l
workers get $W_{1}^{O}$ . Consequently, the ooelleration-t–l old’s work intensity is
$X^{1}-[X^{0}[W_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}],$ $lV_{1}^{O}$ ; $P(1- \triangle_{P})]=[X^{1}]^{O}-\frac{\theta\delta P\triangle_{P}}{f_{2}}[X^{0}]^{O}$
where $[X0]^{O}=X^{0}[\nu V_{0}^{O}, \nu V_{1}^{O}]$ and [X 1] $O=X^{1}[\nu V_{0}^{O}, W_{1}^{O}]$ . Thus, the profit from the work of the
$-\mathit{0}$






where $\pi(t)_{old}|_{\Delta_{P}=0}$ is the profit whcn thc price is $P$ .
If the firm honors the long-term cont ract for the generation-t–l old, the generation-t workers
accept the $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}- \mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$ contract $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}^{\cdot}\mathrm{t}11\mathrm{c}^{\mathrm{Y}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}$ , which is $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}.|\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{d}$ to $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\backslash \mathrm{v}$ price conditio,n. Therefore, the
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$+[ \frac{(P(1-\triangle_{P})-f_{1})^{\underline{9}}}{1-\beta}][\frac{\{\begin{array}{llll}(\mathrm{l}+ \beta)f_{2}+\beta P(1- \Delta_{P})\delta(1- \theta)+2\beta(\theta\delta P(1- \triangle_{P})- \beta^{-1}f_{3}) \end{array}\}}{[4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(\begin{array}{lll}P(1- \triangle_{P})\delta(1- \theta)+2(\theta\delta P(1- \beta^{-1}\Delta_{P})-f_{3}) \end{array})]}]$ .
The Value of the Firm Reneging the Contract (Wage Adjustment). Let us now consider
the value of the firm that adjusts the long-term contract for the old to the new economic condition.
The value of the firm in this case can be calculated in the same way as in the previous section with $P$




$(1+ \frac{(2f_{2}+2\beta(\theta\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})-\beta^{-1}f_{3})+\beta P(1-\Delta_{P})\delta(1-\theta))^{2}}{4f_{2}^{2}-\beta(\delta P(1-\triangle_{l^{\supset}})-\beta^{-1}f_{3})(\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})(1+2\theta)-3\beta^{-1}f_{3})})$;
$\eta_{1}’$ $=$ $\frac{(P(1-\triangle_{P})-f_{1})((1-\theta)\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})+(\theta\delta P(1-\Delta_{P})-\beta^{-1}f_{3}))}{2f_{2}}$;
$\eta_{2}’$ $=$
$\frac{((1-\theta)\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})-1\ulcorner(\theta\delta P(1-\triangle_{P})-\beta^{-1}f_{3}))^{2}}{4f_{2}}$.
Net Gain of Wage Rigidity and $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\cdot \mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ Values Supporting Wage Rigidity. Using the
results obtained so far, we can calculatc the net gain of honoring the long-term contract, which is
$V^{O}|_{\triangle_{P}=0}-V^{C}(X^{0}[\nu V_{0}^{O}, \nu V_{1}^{O}])|_{\triangle_{P>0}}$ .
Although the result is $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{c}}$ated lllatl\iota cmatically, the general characteristics of the net gain of wage
rigidity can be easily illustrated by $\backslash \backslash \dot{\mathfrak{c}}|..\backslash$ of nulnerical examples and corresponding figures. In the
following numerical examples, $\backslash \mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ set $f.$ } $=0$ (no learning buy doing on the disutility of work intensity)
and assume $P=f_{2}=1$ , and $f_{1}=0$ .
Figure 3 illustrates the relation $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\iota\backslash ^{r}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{C}11$ percentage decrease of price, $\triangle p$ (horizontal axis) and the
net gain of wage rigidity (vcrtical $\ \{\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{b}^{\neg}}.$ ) $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\iota\cdot$ paranueter values of $\beta=0.7,$ $\delta=0.5$ , and $\theta=0.5$ .
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Figure 3: Price Decrease and Net Gain of Wage Rigidity
This figure implies that the permaient 6% decrease in the price may cause the renege and adjust-
ment.
Figure 4 shows the domain of $(\theta, \triangle_{P})$ that supports wage rigidity when $\beta=0.7$ and $\delta=0.5$ The
range below the curve is the $1\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}$ term-contract supporting domain of $(\theta, \triangle_{P})$ .
Figure 4: $(\theta, \triangle p)$ supporting wage rigidity
This figure illustrates that as the $\backslash \cdot 0\iota\cdot \mathrm{k}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}$’ share increases, the long-term wage contract becomes
more robust with respect to $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{o}}^{\sigma}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ in the price.
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